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POLICING PUBLIC COMPANIES: AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE AND
THE ROLE PLAYED BY STATE SECURITIES REGULATORS
Amanda M Rose* & Larry J. LeBlanct
Abstract
Multiple different securities law enforcers can pursue U.S. public
companies for the same misconduct. These enforcers include a variety
of federal agencies, class action attorneys, and derivative litigation
attorneys, as well as fifty separate state regulators. Scholars and policy
makers have increasingly questioned whether the benefits of this multi-
enforcer approach are worth the costs, or whether a more coordinated
and streamlined securities enforcement regime might lead to efficiency
gains. How serious are these concerns? And what role do state
regulators play in the enforcement mix? Whereas the enforcement
efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and class action
lawyers have been well-studied, almost no empirical research has been
done on state enforcement.
This Article provides an empirical foundation for considering these
questions. We reviewed the Item 3 "material litigation" disclosures in
the fiscal year 2004-2006 Form 10-Ks filed by every domestic public
company that listed common stock on the New York Stock Exchange at
any time from 2000-2010-a total of 5,441 Form 10-Ks filed by 1,977
distinct companies. In our unique dataset, 72% of companies disclosed
some form of material litigation over the span of the three-year period
examined, and 27% disclosed some form of securities litigation.
Remarkably, well over half of the companies that disclosed securities
litigation reported facing two or more different forms of securities
litigation, and nearly 30% reported facing three or more.
The securities-related state matters disclosed in our dataset share
some interesting characteristics. They tended to target out-of-state firms
(68%) and to involve scandals that beset the financial industry (85%).
Overwhelmingly, they were accompanied by a related federal action or
investigation (91%), and very often were accompanied by related
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private litigation (67%). Whereas only 34% of states have an elected (as
opposed to appointed) securities regulator, these states were responsible
for 80% of the state matters disclosed. We ran regressions controlling
for other variables that might influence a state's level of enforcement
activity. Our statistically significant results indicate that states with
elected enforcers brought securities-related matters at more than four
times the rate of other states, and states with an elected Democrat
serving as the securities regulator brought matters at nearly seven times
the rate of other states.
Our findings bring into focus several important public policy
questions concerning the use of multiple securities law enforcers in
general, and the social value of state enforcement in particular, that
merit further exploration.
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INTRODUCTION
American public companies frequently complain that they operate in
an "overly litigious" business environment. While the litigation risk
they face spans a dizzying array of areas, securities litigation risk is
often singled out for especially harsh criticism. This is due in part to
America's use of multiple securities law enforcers. These enforcers
include a variety of federal public and quasi-public bodies (such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Department of Justice
(DOJ), and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)), as well
as private class action attorneys, private derivative litigation attorneys,
and fifty separate state regulators. Each of these enforcers may act
independently of the others, giving rise to the possibility of expensive
duplicate litigation and inconsistent enforcement policies. While the
intensity of U.S. securities law enforcement likely plays an important
role in keeping the cost of capital low for U.S. listed firms, numerous
scholars have questioned whether more streamlined enforcement efforts
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might achieve the same or better results at lower cost.1
What is missing from this debate is a good sense of the magnitude of
the potential problem. How often do U.S. public companies experience
litigation generally, and securities litigation specifically? And how often
are they targeted by multiple securities law enforcers? Also missing
from the debate is a good sense of the enforcement role played by state
securities regulators. While the role of federal public enforcement and
private class action enforcement of the securities laws has been well-
studied,2 almost no empirical research has been done on state
enforcement. 3 Congress broadly preempted ex ante state regulation of
public companies' securities offerings and disclosure documents in the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), but
explicitly preserved state authority to bring government enforcement
actions against these companies "[for] fraud or deceit, or unlawful
conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities
transactions."4 The targeting of public companies by Eliot Spitzer and his
1. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 69-70 (2011) (arguing that fraud-on-the-market securities
class actions should be eliminated and replaced with stepped-up public enforcement efforts);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229,
304 (2007) (suggesting that flaws in private securities enforcement may warrant increased
reliance on public enforcement); Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud. An
Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 81 (2011) (arguing for more targeted deterrence of
corporate fraud); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public And Private Enforcement of
Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECoN. 207, 209 (2009) (questioning the
effectiveness of private enforcement relative to public enforcement); Amanda M. Rose, The
Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2173, 2176 (2010) (questioning whether the preconditions for efficient use of multiple securities
law enforcers exist in the United States and arguing for greater centralization of enforcement
efforts); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform. Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301-02 (2008) (arguing that SEC oversight of securities class actions would lead to efficiency
gains); see also COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 9-10, 68-69 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l 1.30
CommitteeInterim ReportREV2.pdf (recommending reforms to encourage greater
coordination between state and federal securities regulators).
2. For helpfuil summaries of the extant literature, see James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical
Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws, 6 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 164, 170
(2009). For an older survey focused on private enforcement, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence
on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1468-1504 (2004).
3. Some recent empirical work has been done on private enforcement under state law.
See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 1, at 53; Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State
Court, 80 U. C1N. L. REV. 349, 349-53 (2012). Our focus here, however, is on public
enforcement by state regulators.
4. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. In 1998, Congress also broadly preempted
securities class actions based on state law, with important carve-outs for traditional corporate
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successors as New York Attorney General has led some to praise and
others to criticize NSMIA's "fraud carve-out," as it has come to be known.
But beyond anecdotal accounts of New York's high-profile enforcement
efforts, we know little about how states have utilized their preserved
authority.
This Article responds to these important foundational questions. We
examined the fiscal year (FY) 2004, FY 2005, and FY 2006 Form 10-
Ks filed by every domestic U.S. company that listed common stock on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) at any point in the last
decade-a total of 5,441 Form 10-Ks filed by 1,977 different firms.
Specifically, we examined the "material litigation" disclosures found in
Item 3 of these Form 10-Ks, recording whether the companies disclosed
any material litigation and, if so, whether they disclosed securities
litigation. If a company disclosed securities litigation, we tracked
which of the following four forms of securities litigation it disclosed: a
class action; a derivative action; a federal regulatory action or
investigation; or a state regulatory action or investigation. We also
recorded additional information about the securities-related state
enforcement actions and investigations disclosed, such as the identity of
the enforcing state, their topic, and whether they overlapped with
related federal or private enforcement efforts.
Our findings support the contention that American public companies
operate in a highly litigious business environment generally, and that
they confront significant enforcement in the securities law area in
particular-often at the hands of multiple different enforcers. Of the
companies in our dataset, 72% disclosed that they faced some form of
material litigation over the course of the three years examined and 27%
disclosed some form of securities litigation-with two in every ten
disclosing a securities class action. Remarkably, 56% of the companies
that disclosed securities litigation reported at least two forms of
securities litigation, and 28% reported three or more. Moreover, nearly
40% of companies that disclosed a federal regulatory action or
investigation at the hands of the SEC also disclosed that at least one
other federal regulator, such as the DOJ, had targeted them. One cannot
conclude from these findings that the securities laws are being overly
law litigation. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
5. Form 10-K filers are required to disclose any material pending legal proceedings,
other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which they, a subsidiary, or
their property is subject. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2012). We focused on Form 10-Ks filed for
the fiscal years 2004-2006 because these were the most recent that would disclose mostly
completed securities litigation. See, e.g., Jordan Milev, Robert Patton & Svetlana Starykh,
Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 Mid-Year Review, NERA ECON.
CONSULTING 14, Fig. 16 (2011), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB Mid-YearTrends_0711
(3).pdf.
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enforced, but the findings do suggest that policymakers should consider
seriously whether more streamlined enforcement efforts might lead to
efficiency gains.
Our findings also illuminate the enforcement role state securities
regulators play. Just 8% of the companies in our dataset that disclosed
some form of securities litigation disclosed a securities-related state
enforcement action or investigation, as compared to 74% for class
actions, 48% for derivative actions, and 45% for a federal regulatory
action or investigation. Although few in number, the disclosed
securities-related state enforcement actions and investigations share
several interesting characteristics. They were largely: directed at out-of-
state companies (that is, those neither headquartered nor incorporated in
the enforcing state) (68%); targeted at firms in the financial sector
(93%); and aimed at misconduct implicating an industry-wide scandal,
as opposed to isolated instances of firm-specific misconduct (85%).
Moreover, the vast majority involved at least one overlapping
investigation or action by another securities law enforcer (93%).
Our findings also reveal important differences in state securities
enforcement behavior. A clear majority of the states (thirty-two) were
not identified as pursuing any securities enforcement efforts against the
public companies in our dataset. Fourteen states were identified as
pursuing between one and four distinct enforcement actions or
investigations, while four states-New York, West Virginia,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts-were responsible for 70% of the total
number of state actions and investigations disclosed, each bringing
between eight and thirty-one.
There was also a marked difference between the enforcement
behavior of states with elected securities regulators and that of states
with appointed securities regulators. Whereas 36% of states have an
elected securities regulator, these states were responsible for 80% of the
matters disclosed. We ran regressions controlling for other variables
that might influence a state's level of enforcement activity. Our
statistically significant results indicate that states with elected enforcers
brought matters at more than four times the rate of states with appointed
enforcers. Notably, states with an elected Democrat serving as the
securities regulator brought matters at nearly seven times the rate of
other states. Our findings thus support the claim that states' pursuit of
public companies for securities-related misconduct has a partisan
political dimension.6
This Article represents an important first step in understanding the
role state regulators play in policing public companies for securities-
6. In the time frame studied, both the SEC and the Presidency were controlled by
Republicans.
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related misconduct. Additional research, both theoretical and empirical,
would help answer the key questions this Article brings into focus. For
example, is it wise to rely on elected state regulators to supplement the
enforcement efforts of the SEC, an agency that was specifically
designed to remain insulated from political pressures? And what
motivates certain states to police public companies in this area, while
the vast majority chooses not to? Better understanding state motivations
would help in determining the likely social value of NSMIA's fraud
carve-out, and might inform expectations about state enforcement
behavior vis-d-vis public companies in other important legal areas.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes
our data collection process and offers descriptive statistics on the
companies in our dataset. Part II provides descriptive statistics on the
litigation disclosed by the companies in our dataset, with a detailed
focus on the extent and types of securities litigation experienced. Part
III provides background on the role of state securities regulators in
policing public companies and offers statistics on the state securities
enforcement efforts disclosed by the companies in our dataset, including
the results of our regressions. The Article then briefly concludes,
highlighting avenues of further research that our dataset open up.
I. OVERVIEW OF DATASET
A. Data Collection Process
One of our primary goals in conducting this research was to find out
more about the role that state regulators have played in policing public
companies for securities fraud. No one has previously compiled
comprehensive information about state securities enforcement efforts
targeting this population of firms, and this information is not readily
available through state-based sources. We therefore chose to consult the
Form 10-K that public companies are required to file with the SEC on
an annual basis and which is readily available on the SEC's website.7
Specifically, Part I, Item 3, of the Form 10-K requires filers to
7. In the time frame examined, a company could become obligated to file a Form 10-K
in three ways: (1) if its stock traded on a national securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(2006); (2) if it had more than $10 million in assets and equity securities held by more than 500
record owners, id. § 78m(); or (3) if it had filed a registration statement with the SEC that had
gone effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Id. § 78o(d). Companies who triggered
reporting obligations in the first way could subsequently avoid them by delisting. Companies
who triggered them in the second way could subsequently avoid them if the number of owners
of their equity securities dropped below 300, or if for three years they consistently had fewer
than 500 such owners and fewer than $10 million in assets, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (2011).
Finally, reporting obligations triggered in the third manner described above could be suspended
one year after the offering if (and so long as) the number of owners of the securities to which the
registration statement related was below 300, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
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"[d]escribe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the
registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their
property is subject.",8 Filers are instructed to provide certain basic
information about such proceedings, as well as about "any such
proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities." 9
We examined the Item 3 disclosures in the FY 2004, FY 2005, and FY
2006 Form 10-Ks filed by U.S. companies that listed common stock on
the NYSE at some point in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
10
The NYSE is by far the largest U.S. stock exchange in terms of market
capitalization; focusing on firms that listed common stock on that
exchange over a ten-year period thus gives us a window into the
litigation experiences of a broad set of U.S. public companies." We
focused on these firms' disclosed litigation experiences in the fiscal
years 2004-2006 in order to maximize the likelihood that the litigation
would be completed. 12
To identify the companies whose Form 10-Ks we would examine,
we consulted three sources of NYSE data. First, we consulted the
NYSE's online directory of U.S. companies listing common stock.
1 3
Each company listed in that directory on December 9, 2010, is captured
in our dataset if it filed a Form 10-K for the years 2004, 2005, or
2006.14 Second, we consulted the NYSE's March 2000 issue of Stocks
& Bonds on the New York Stock Exchange, which catalogues all firms
listing common stock on the NYSE on February 29, 2000. We then
added to the dataset any U.S. firms identified by that source, provided
that they had filed a Form 10-K for the year 2004, 2005, or 2006.
Lastly, we added to the dataset U.S. firms identified on the NYSE's
annual year-end "New Common Stock Listings" roll for any of the
years 2000 through 2010, as long as they filed a Form 10-K for the year
8. See supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. We treat as a 2004 10-K any 10-K filed for fiscal years ending after March 31, 2004
and on or before March 31, 2005; we treat as a 2005 10-K any 10-K filed for fiscal years ending
after March 31, 2005 and on or before March 31, 2006; we treat as a 2006 10-K any 10-K filed
for fiscal years ending after March 31, 2006 and on or before March 31, 2007.
11. The market capitalization of firms listed on the NYSE was $12.4 trillion, as compared
to $3.5 trillion for firms listed on the NASDAQ, as of March 2010. See The 15 Largest Stock
Markets and Exchanges, TODAY FORWARD (Apr. 27, 2010), http://todayforward.typepad.
com/todayforward/ 2010/04/the- 15-largest-stock-markets-and-exchanges.html.
12. Securities litigation can be quite lengthy. NERA Economic Consulting reports that for
settled securities class actions filed between January 2000 and June 2011, the average time from
filing to completion is 4.4 years. See Milev, et al., supra note 5, at 15.
13. See Listings Directory, NYSE (Sept. 27, 2012, 5:03 PM) http://www.nyse.com/about
listed/Ilcny-issuetype_1 076458359969.html?ListedComp=US.
14. We drop from the dataset any company whose 10-Ks disclose a place of incorporation
or principal executive offices outside one of the fifty U.S. states.
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2004, 2005, or 2006.15 To the extent these sources are accurate and
complete, our collection process yielded a comprehensive list of all U.S.
companies that both (1) had common stock listed on the NYSE at any
point between February 29, 2000, and December 31, 2010, and (2) filed
a 2004, 2005, or 2006 Form 10-K.
We examined each of the FY 2004-2006 Form 10-Ks filed by the
companies we identified and recorded the following information in an
Excel database:
" Company name;
* Year of report;
* State of incorporation;
* State of principal executive offices;
* Whether any material litigation is disclosed in Item 3 (including
by reference); 16
• If material litigation is disclosed, whether any of it is securities-
related;17
* If securities-related material litigation is disclosed:
* Whether a securities-related class action is disclosed;
" Whether a derivative action is disclosed;
15. These publications can be accessed online for the years 2003-2007. New Common
Stock Listings, 200x, NYSE TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/NYSE/Facts
Figures/tabid/ll 15/Default.aspx (search "new common stock listings," then follow "Listed
Companies" hyperlink). We obtained them for the years 2000-2002 and 2008-2010 directly
from the NYSE's archivist.
16. We treated a company as disclosing "material litigation" in Item 3 if it provided some
specific information about at least one piece of litigation (against the firm, one of its
subsidiaries, or one of its officers or directors), even if the company did not disclose all of the
details required by Item 3, and even if the company also stated that it did not think the litigation
was material. We did not treat a company as disclosing material litigation, however, if the
disclosure was mere boilerplate (for example, "from time to time, the company is subject to a
variety of claims involving X, Y, and Z"). In addition to material litigation, companies must
disclose environmental proceedings and regulatory investigations. These, if they meet the
requirement of specificity noted above, were counted even if the investigation had not led to the
initiation of a formal proceeding against the company. If the company disclosed that a
shareholder had presented to the company's board of directors a demand to bring suit, we did
not treat this as material litigation unless the shareholder had already filed a derivative suit in
court.
17. We construed "securities-related" broadly to include not just securities fraud suits, but
also any investigations or actions initiated by the SEC (which include actions brought under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), corporate law breach of fiduciary duty suits, litigation
challenging a merger or acquisition, and shareholder derivative litigation. We did not treat
ERISA matters as securities-related. Cases involving insurance presented a challenge, as some
but not all insurance products have an investment component and have been treated as securities
by the SEC. We treated as securities-related insurance matters that involved variable annuities,
indexed annuities, and other "nontraditional" insurance products. Matters that were focused
primarily on traditional fixed insurance products, or on the marketing of insurance generally
(such as state investigations into contingent commissions and "bid rigging" in the insurance
industry) were not treated as securities-related.
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" Whether a securities-related federal regulatory investigation or
action is disclosed, 18 and if so, the identity of said regulator(s);
" Whether a securities-related state regulatory investigation or
action is disclosed, 19 and if so, the identity of the responsible
state(s), and the topic of the investigation(s) or action(s); and
0 If a securities-related state regulatory investigation or action is
disclosed and a securities-related class action, derivative action,
or securities-related federal regulatory investigation or action is
disclosed, whether they are related.
The dataset we created is comprehensive and provides a great deal of
useful information about the litigation experiences of an important
group of public companies. However, it has certain limitations that
should be acknowledged at the outset. First, it leaves out certain
categories of companies. We chose to look at the litigation experiences
of all U.S. companies that traded common stock on the NYSE at some
point between 2000 and 2010 and filed 10-Ks for the year 2004, 2005,
or 2006. We therefore did not examine firms that traded common stock
on the NYSE at some point between 2000 and 2010 but did not file 10-
Ks for the year 2004, 2005, or 2006.2 1 Foreign firms and firms that
traded only securities other than common stock on the NYSE from
2000-2010 were likewise excluded from the analysis. And because we
examined only the litigation experiences of U.S. companies that traded
common stock on the NYSE at some point between 2000 and 2010,
firms that traded exclusively on the NASDAQ or another exchange
during that time period were also excluded from the analysis. The
litigation experiences of the firms excluded from the dataset may differ
from those of the firms we analyzed.
Second, we focused on firms' litigation experiences in the fiscal
22years 2004, 2005, and 2006. 2 Enforcement patterns may change with
the times, especially with the economic climate (with more aggressive
enforcement generally thought to occur in the wake of a financial
crisis). A different picture might emerge if instead we examined the 10-
18. These would include matters brought by the SEC, securities-related criminal matters
brought by the DOJ (including U.S. Attorneys), and enforcement matters initiated by SEC
supervised self-regulatory organization (SROs) (which at the time included the NASD and
NYSE, since consolidated into FINRA).
19. We do not count actions brought by state pension funds or otherwise brought by states
in a proprietary capacity to recover investment losses suffered by the state. Instead, we are
focused on actions brought by the state in its sovereign capacity.
20. To answer this question sometimes required investigating additional sources outside
the 10-K.
21. This means that firms that failed, were acquired, or "went dark" prior to 2004 are
excluded from the analysis. It also means that firms that obtained public company status for the
first time only after 2006 are excluded.
22. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
2013]
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Ks filed by the same set of companies in a different period.
Third, it is important to note that Item 3 disclosures cannot provide a
perfect picture of the litigation experiences of the companies in the
dataset. For one thing, the Item 3 disclosure obligation is subject to a
"materiality" standard. The SEC has provided some guidance on the
type of litigation that firms should treat as material. For example, firms
are instructed that they need not include information about litigation
involving "primarily a claim for damages" if the amount involved does
not exceed 10% of the company's current assets.2 3 But the concept of
materiality remains hazy and subject to interpretation, and companies
seeking to avoid the release of negative information may interpret it in a
self-serving way-at the very least, companies are likely to interpret the
materiality standard in nonuniform ways.24 In addition, some companies
may voluntarily disclose information about legal proceedings even if
they consider them immaterial, whereas other companies may not.
To gauge the quality and consistency of the Item 3 disclosures by the
companies in our dataset, we compared our results with the database of
federal securities class actions maintained by the Stanford Law School
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The Stanford database indicates
that federal securities class actions were filed against a total of 215
NYSE listed firms in the years 2004-2006. Of these 215 firms, 176 are
in our dataset (not all are in our dataset because some failed to meet
our criteria for inclusion-for example, they were foreign, or did not
file Form 10-Ks in any of the years 2004, 2005, or 2006.). Of the 176
firms in our dataset, 169 filed Form 10-Ks in the year the Stanford
database indicates a federal securities class action was filed against
them. We recorded 157 of these 169 firms as having disclosed a
securities-related class action in that year-indicating a disclosure rate
of 92.9%.25
23. See supra note 5, Instruction 2. It is unlikely that actions brought by state regulators
would be treated as involving "primarily" a claim for "damages." First, if states sought a
monetary recovery it would be a fine or penalty, not "damages." See supra note 19. Second, a
final order by a state securities commissioner or like state agency finding a securities law
violation can have serious collateral consequences for a firm. For example, it may limit the
firm's ability to participate in certain exempt securities offerings. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.262(a)(4) (2012) (disqualification provision of Regulation A); id. 230.505(b)(2)(iii)
(adopting Regulation A's disqualification provision for Rule 505 offerings under Regulation D);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(9) (2006) (SEC may censure, deny, or suspend registration of
investment advisor subject to final order by state securities commissioner based on fraud,
deception, or manipulative conduct); id. § 78o(b)(4)(H) (same for brokers and dealers).
24. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (defining information as
material if a "reasonable investor" would consider it significant in making an investment
decision).
25. The actual disclosure rate is arguably even higher, at 94.67% (160/169). This is
because three of the twelve companies we did not record as having disclosed a securities class
action in their Form 10-K in the same year as the Stanford database in fact made disclosures
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Finally, it is important to note that Item 3 asks companies to disclose
material litigation proceedings to which they are subject, as well as to
include "similar information as to any such proceedings known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities." When considering the
results of our data analysis, one should keep this in mind. What we
count as a federal or state regulatory matter may involve nothing more
than a subpoena or request for information from the company that never
amounts to a formal prosecution.
27
In addition to the foregoing company information culled from the
Form 10-Ks, we collected a variety of census data related to each of the
fifty states. We also determined whether the primary securities enforcer
in each state was appointed or elected 8
B. Descriptive Statistics on Companies in Dataset
The data collection process described above resulted in the
identification of 1,977 distinct companies and the examination of 5,441
Form 10-Ks. The number of Form 10-Ks we examined is less than three
times the number of companies, because not all companies filed Form
likely referencing the securities class action, but due to vagueness we did not record them as
class actions.
26. See supra note 5 (emphasis added).
27. A recent decision clarifies, however, that companies are required to disclose
regulatory investigations only when they "mature[] to a point where litigation is apparent and
substantially certain to occur." Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86556, *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
28. If the department or agency primarily responsible for enforcing the state's securities
laws is headed by an elected (appointed) official, we treat the securities regulator as elected
(appointed). California, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Virginia presented special cases. The
California Department of Corporations, headed by an appointed official, has historically had
primary responsibility for enforcing California's securities laws; California's elected attorney
general could step in only upon referral by the Department of Corporations. In October 2003,
however, a law was enacted giving the California attorney general broad concurrent authority to
enforce the state's securities laws. See Nicholas Campins, A New Paradigm for Securities
Regulation in California: Senate Bill 434 and its Implications (unpublished student paper,
National State Attorneys General Program, Columbia University), https://www.law.columbia
.edu/centerprogram/ag/resources/studentpapers. We therefore treat California as a state with an
elected securities regulator. We also classified Connecticut as a state with an elected securities
enforcer although its appointed banking commissioner has primary formal responsibility for
enforcing the state's securities laws. We did so because 90% of the securities-related
enforcement actions Connecticut was disclosed to have brought involved not its banking
commissioner but instead its elected attorney general. With respect to no other state did a
majority of the disclosed securities-related enforcement actions involve an elected (appointed)
state regulator when the state regulator with formal primary authority over securities
enforcement was appointed (elected). New Hampshire and Virginia were special cases because
the securities regulators in those states are "elected" by the state legislature rather than
appointed by the state governor; we believe it is appropriate to group them in the appointed
category because the regulators are not directly exposed to popular election. The elected or
appointed status of each state's securities regulator is reported infra at Table 6.
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10-Ks in each of the three years examined.29 We examined 1,843 FY
2004 Form 10-Ks, 1,820 FY 2005 Form 10-Ks, and 1,778 FY 2006
Form 10-Ks. Out of the 1,977 companies in the dataset, 1,822 filed
Form 10-Ks in at least two of the years examined and 1,642 filed Form
10-Ks in all three years.
Table A. 1 lists by state the percentage of companies in our dataset
that disclosed each state as their state of incorporation.3 ° Not
surprisingly, Delaware dominates, serving as the state of incorporation
to 59% of the companies. Maryland, the next highest, is light-years
away with only 9%. Table A.3 lists by state the percentage of
companies that disclosed each state as the location of their principal
executive offices.31 Texas, New York, and California dominate here,
with Texas taking first-home to the principal executive offices of 12%
of the companies in our dataset.
As reported in Table A.5, roughly 30% of the companies in our
dataset disclosed that their principal executive offices were located in
their state of incorporation. If companies incorporated in Delaware are
excluded, the number jumps to nearly 70%. This means that nearly 70%
of companies not incorporated in Delaware were incorporated in the
state where their principal executive offices were located. Where were
those companies in the dataset with their principal executive offices in
their states of incorporation located? Table A.6 shows the percentage of
companies that disclosed each state as both the state of their principal
executive offices and incorporation. 32 Ohio tops the list, home to 10%
of this group of companies. Table A.8 reports on the subset of
companies disclosing states different from their state of incorporation as
the location of their principal executive offices. Specifically, it shows
the percentage of these companies incorporated in each state. 33
29. A variety of reasons could explain this. For example, a company that filed a 10-K in
one of the years of interest might have ceased to exist in the subsequent year (because it was
acquired, or because it went bankrupt). A company might also have escaped any obligation to
file a 10-K by losing its public company status ("going dark"). See supra note 7 for the ways in
which a company can do this. It is also possible that a company filed fewer than three reports
because it went public for the first time in 2005 or 2006.
30. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified
as a state of incorporation in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by 5,441. Year-by-
year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.2.
31. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified
as the location of a company's principal executive offices in the 5,441 Form 10-Ks examined
and divided by 5,441. Year-by-year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.4.
32. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified
as the location of both a company's principal executive offices and state of incorporation in the
5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by the total number of Form 10-Ks disclosing the
same state as the location of a company's principal executive offices and state of incorporation.
Year-by-year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.7.
33. To compute these percentages, we totaled the number of times the state was identified
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Delaware's showing is predictably even stronger here as compared to
Table A.1; it claims the incorporations of more than 81% of the
companies in our dataset incorporated outside their headquarters state.
II. THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE
Our review of the Item 3 disclosures by the companies in our dataset
strongly supports the claim that U.S. public companies face significant
litigation risk, and in particular securities litigation risk--often at the
hands of multiple different enforcers. This Part describes the crowded
litigation landscape painted by our data.
Table 1, Column A, shows the percentage of companies in the
dataset that disclosed, in at least one of their examined Form 10-Ks,
each type of litigation for which we recorded data (year-by-year results
are reported in the Appendix at Table A.10.). Striking is the fact that
72% of companies disclosed some form of material litigation over the
course of the three-year period examined, and more than a quarter
disclosed some form of securities litigation-with approximately two in
every ten disclosing a securities class action. 34 Column B reports on the
subset of companies disclosing material litigation and Column C reports
on the smaller subset disclosing securities litigation. Whereas 27% of all
companies disclosed some form of securities litigation, 38% of the
subset of companies that disclosed material litigation also disclosed
some form of securities litigation. Of the smaller subset disclosing
securities litigation, 74% disclosed a securities class action, 48%
disclosed a derivative action, 45% disclosed a securities-related federal
regulatory investigation or action, and 8% disclosed a securities-related
as the location of a company's state of incorporation but not its principal executive offices in the
5,441 Form 10-Ks examined and divided by the total number of reports disclosing a state of
incorporation different than the location of a 'company's principal executive offices. Year-by-
year results are reported in the appendix at Table A.9.
34. A total of 399 of the 1,977 firms in our dataset disclosed a securities class action in at
least one of their reports (20.18%). We did not track whether the disclosed securities class
action was brought under federal or state law. According to our search of the Stanford Law
School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database, however, at least 255 of these 399 firms
had a federal securities class action filed against them in the 2002-2006 timeframe-
approximately 64%. The percentage of the 399 firms disclosing a federal securities class action
is likely higher, however, for two reasons. First, the Stanford database only allowed us to sort
for firms listed on the NYSE in the year the complaint was filed, whereas our dataset includes
all firms that were listed on the NYSE at any point in 2000-2010 (if they met our other criteria
for inclusion). Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW
SCHOOL, http://securities.stanford.edu. Second, some of the firms in our dataset may have been
reporting on federal securities class actions filed prior to 2002. See supra note 12. Even taking
this into account, however, our data suggests a nontrivial amount of state securities class action
litigation took place in this time period, a finding that is consistent with other empirical studies.
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 25 Fig. 1 (indicating that over 250 state law securities class actions
were filed in the 2002-2006 timeframe against all, not just NYSE-listed, companies).
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state regulatory investigation or action.
A B C
Cos. Disclosing Cos. Disclosing
All Cos. Material Securities
(n=1977) Litigation Litigation
(n=1420) (n=538)
Any Material 72% -- -
Litigation_________
Securities 27% 38%
Litigation
Class Action 20% 28% 74%
Derivativeatin 13% 18% 48%Action
Federal 17% 45%
Regulatory
StateSae2% 3% 8%
Regulatory
Table 2 shows how often companies in the dataset disclosing
securities litigation disclosed multiple different forms of securities
litigation over the span of the three-year period examined.35 Well over
half disclosed facing securities litigation at the hands of at least two
different types of enforcers, and well over a quarter disclosed facing
securities litigation at the hands of at least three. Table 2 also shows
how often companies that disclosed being the target of a securities-
related state regulatory investigation or action disclosed multiple
different forms of securities litigation over the span of the three-year
period. The rates are dramatically higher for this subgroup-nearly all
disclosed facing securities litigation at the hands of multiple enforcers.
35. The forms we tracked are (1) class action, (2) derivative action, (3) federal
regulatory investigation or action, and (4) state regulatory investigation or action.
Table 1. Item 3 Litigation Disclosures by Type
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Table 2. Disclosure of Multiple Forms of Securities Litigation*
Securities Cos. Disclosing a
Cos. Disclosing Seurt ecuiisRlaestt
LitigtionSecurities-Related StateLitigation Regulatory Matter
> 2 Forms of
Securities 56% (n=256/457) 98% (n=41/42)
Litigation
> 3 Forms of
Securities 28% (n=126/457) 76% (n=32/42)
Litigation
*Note: Limited to companies filing reports in all three years.
Table 3 focuses on the 243 companies that disclosed being the target
of one or more securities-related federal regulatory investigations or
actions, reporting how often these companies identified various federal
regulators as being involved. The SEC was the dominant federal
regulator, involved 98% of the time.
Table 3. Securities-Related Federal Regulatory Matters by
Enforcer
Cos. Disclosing a Securities-Related Federal
Regulatory Matter
Targeted by SEC 97.94% (n=238/243)
Targeted by DOJ 30.04% (n=73/243)
Targeted by NASD 11.11% (n=27/243)
Targeted by NYSE 5.76% (n= 14/243)
Of the 238 companies in our dataset that disclosed being the target of
an SEC investigation or action, ninety-four-nearly 40%-reported that
they were also targeted by at least one other public or quasi-public
federal regulator, such as the DOJ or the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD).
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III. STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Though states retain significant enforcement authority, their role in
securities regulation is relatively limited today. The National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) broadly preempted state
authority to regulate the offering of "covered securities"-which
include securities traded on national exchanges-as well as the ongoing
disclosure obligations of the firms issuing them.36 In connection with
NSMIA's adoption, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee
of Conference described dual state-federal securities regulation as
"redundant, costly, and ineffective," and noted testimony that it "tends
to raise the cost of capital to American issuers of securities without
providing commensurate protection to investors or to our markets."
37
Through its preemption provisions, NSMIA sought "to firmly ensconce
the SEC as 'the exclusive regulator of national offerings of
securities.' 38 Two years after NSMIA's adoption, Congress enacted the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 39 which
precluded most state law fraud class actions involving "covered
36. NSMIA provides that:
no law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any State or
any political subdivision thereof-
(1) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or
registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or indirectly
apply to a security that-
(A) is a covered security; or
(B) will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction;
(2) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose any conditions upon the
use of-
(A) with respect to a covered security..., any offering document that is
prepared by or on behalf of the issuer; or
(B) any proxy statement, report to shareholders, or other disclosure document
relating to a covered security or the issuer thereof that is required to be and is
filed with the Commission or any national securities organization registered
under section 78o-3 of this title, except that this subparagraph does not apply
to the laws, rules, regulations, or orders, or other administrative actions of the
State of incorporation of the issuer; or
(3) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose conditions, based on the
merits of such offering or issuer, upon the offer or sale of any security
described in paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006).
37. H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996).
38. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil. State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot
Spitzer, 70 BROOKLYN L. REv. 117, 125 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996)).
39. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p & 78bb) (2006).
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securit[ies]'AO similarly defined to include securities traded on national
exchanges.41 SLUSA was a reaction to charges that class action lawyers
were filing securities fraud claims under state law as a way to avoid new
restrictions on federal securities class actions created by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Importantly, both NSMIA
and SLUSA expressly preserved the authority of state securities
commissions (or like state agencies) to bring enforcement actions with
respect to fraud or deceit.
42
It was NSMIA's fraud carve-out that allowed Eliot Spitzer to bring
his high-profile enforcement actions to remedy perceived Wall Street
abuses during his tenure as attorney general of New York. Spitzer
utilized his preserved authority to initiate numerous actions against
nationally traded companies pursuant to New York's turbocharged
Martin Act. 43 For example, Spitzer pursued major brokerage houses44
for allegedly producing biased analyst research. He also pursued
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b) & 78bb(f)(1) (2006). SLUSA contains important carve-outs for
traditional state corporate law litigation. Id §§ 77p(d) & 78bb(f)(3).
41. See id. §§ 77p(f)(3) & 78bb(f)(5)(E).
42. Id. § 77r(c)(1) ("Consistent with this section, the securities commission (or any
agency or office performing like functions) of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws
of such State to investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or
unlawful conduct by a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions.")
(NSMIA); id. § 77p(e) ("The securities commission (or any agency or office performing like
functions) of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and
bring enforcement actions.") (SLUSA). Companies whose shares trade nationally are
necessarily within the potential jurisdictional reach of all fifty states. See Michael A. Perino,
Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 273, 326 (1998).
43. The Martin Act grants the New York attorney general broad powers to investigate
securities fraud. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (2012); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63 (2012).
Prosecutions under the Act require no showing of scienter or intent to defraud, and its use of the
term "fraud" and "fraudulent practices" is read to "include all deceitful practices contrary to the
plain rules of common honesty." People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 330 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432
(1972).
44. The analyst research scandal involved alleged conflicts of interest between brokerage
firms' investment banking and securities research arms. Specifically, these firms were alleged to
have disseminated biased research that favored their investment banking clients and helped to
attract future underwriting business. Eliot Spitzer, acting as NYAG, is widely credited with
bringing the scandal to the public's attention in 2002, though the SEC had been actively
studying the problem of analyst conflicts of interest and appropriate regulatory responses since
1999. See Regulation Analyst Certification, [Rel. No. 33-8119] (proposed Aug. 2, 2002) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8119.htm#.
Spitzer's investigation of Merrill Lynch uncovered sensational internal emails in which analysts
derided as pieces of "junk" companies whose securities they rated as a buy. Spitzer's efforts
caught the attention of other regulators, and a coordinated investigation into the rest of the
industry was launched, with the SEC, NASD, NYSE, NYAG, and nine other states splitting up
the investigative burden. See The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE
NEW YORKER 54 (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/04/07/03
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several major mutual fund advisors for allegedly permitting favored
fund investors to engage in late trading and market timing
undisclosed practices that diluted the returns of longer-term investors.
Some lauded Spitzer's actions as promoting the goal of optimal
0407fa fact cassidy?currentPage=all. In 2003, ten of the largest Wall Street brokerage firms
reached a "global settlement" to resolve biased research allegations with the SEC, NASD,
NYSE, National Association of State Securities Administrators (NASAA), and regulators from
all fifty states. See SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements, SEC (Apr. 28,
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm. The settlement involved an unprecedented
collective payment in excess of $1.4 billion and sweeping structural reforms to prevent the
firms' investment banking arms from unduly influencing analyst research. See Press Release,
N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., Sec, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and
State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement To Reform Investment Practices (Dec. 20,
2002), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/sec-ny-attorney-general-nasd-nasaa-nyse
-and-state-regulators-announce-historic (describing the terms of the settlement). The settlement
also banned the settling firms from allocating IPO shares to corporate officials in a position to
influence their company's hiring of investment bankers-a practice known as "IPO Spinning."
See id. In addition to these regulatory efforts, Spitzer's revelations also led to the filing of 313
class actions related to biased analyst research as well as 68 class actions related to the
allocation of shares in IPOs. See generally Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, http://securities.stanford.edu.
45. Market timing and late trading are trading strategies that exploit the way open-end
mutual fund shares are priced. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.
Ct. 2296, 2300 n.1 (2011). Both practices can dilute the value of a mutual fund to the detriment
of its other investors. On September 3, 2003 then-NYAG Eliot Spitzer publicly released a
complaint against (and simultaneous $40 million settlement with) hedge fund Canary Capital
Partners, accusing Canary of late trading certain Bank of America mutual funds in collusion
with the funds' investment advisor. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen.,
State Investigation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ag.ny
.gov/press-release/state-investigation-reveals-mutual-fund-fraud. The Canary Complaint also
accused numerous other mutual fund investment advisors of allowing favored investors to
engage in market timing in violation of policies spelled out in the managed funds' prospectuses.
In return for this privilege, the favored investors allegedly promised to invest so-called "sticky
assets" in high-fee money market or hedge funds also managed by the investment advisor. See
Complaint at 3-4, 12, State v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/archived/canary-complaint.pdf. Spitzer's
complaint against Canary garnered significant media attention and prompted the SEC to conduct
a large-scale examination of the mutual fund industry. See Stephen M. Cutler, SEC Director,
Div. of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks Before The National Regulatory Services
Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer Compliance/Risk Management Conference (Sept. 9,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ speech/spch090903smc.htm. By the end of 2004,
the SEC had brought twenty-nine market timing cases and ordered a total of $552 million in
disgorgement and an additional $480 million in penalties. See SEC 2004 Performance &
Accountability Report, SEC, 24 (May 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/
secpar04.pdf. Spitzer's release of the Canary Complaint also prompted a flood of private
litigation-according to court records, a total of 438 cases were consolidated into market timing
multi-district litigation proceedings in the District of Maryland. AML Statistics Report-
Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets, UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/PendingMDL_Dockets-By-District-January-2013.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (on file with authors).
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deterrence at a time when the SEC was asleep at the switch; others
criticized his actions as politically motivated and ultimately harmful
to the U.S. capital markets.4 The New York Attorney General's
office continues to make controversial enforcement decisions,
provoking calls for reform by industry groups.47 For example,
during his recent stint as New York Attorney General, Andrew
Cuomo grabbed headlines by filing a lawsuit against Bank of America
for fraud in connection with its acquisition of Merrill Lynch,
notwithstanding that the SEC had already taken related action against
the firm.48 He also opened investigations into the adequacy of
disclosures by investment banks that sold mortgage-backed securities, a
topic that has likewise gained the attention of the SEC and DOJ. 4 9
One thing the ongoing debate over the efficacy of NSMIA's fraud
carve-out has been missing is a more complete picture of the role state
securities regulators have played in policing public companies. While
we are generally aware of New York's activity, what-if anything-
have the rest of the states been doing? What type of public companies
have they targeted, and for what sort of misconduct? Is there a political
dimension to states' observed enforcement activity? In this Part, we
report statistics generated by our data that shed light on these and other
questions.
As reported in Table 4, the companies in our dataset disclosed 102
distinct securities-related state regulatory investigations or actions, by
which we mean unique company-state-topic combinations. 50 This
understates the true number, because companies occasionally disclosed
that they were responding to subpoenas and other requests for
information from "state regulators," or that they had reached a
settlement with "state regulators," without specifying these regulators'
46. See Eric Zitzewitz, An Eliot Effect? Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual Fund
Settlement Negotiations 2-3 nn.1-3 (Dartmouth Coll., Working Paper, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1091035 (collecting news stories reflecting
these views).
47. See, e.g., Robert A. McTamaney, New York's Martin Act: Preemption Delayed is
Justice Denied, 26 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (Mar. 25, 2011).
48. See Kara Scannell & Dan Fitzpatrick, SEC Clashes With Cuomo Over Firing In BofA
Case, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB200014240
52748703444804575071372283031624.html.
49. See John C. Coffee, The Spitzer Legacy And The Cuomo Future, N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (Mar.
20, 2008); Amir Efrati, et a]., Prosecutors Widen Probes Into Subprime, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2008, at Cl, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120244312394153109.html. A joint
federal-state task force has recently been created to deal with these issues. See Attorney General
Eric Holder, Attorney General Holder Speaks at the Announcement of the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force's New Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group (Jan.
27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech- 120127.html.
50. Several companies reported being targeted by multiple states, or by the same state
with respect to different types of misconduct. See infra note 72.
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identities. When a company made such a disclosure, and we could not
identify the specific states by reviewing the company's earlier or later
public filings, we counted it only once for purposes of this tally and we
did not attribute the action to any particular state. Also, occasionally a
company listed a variety of states that were investigating multiple
different matters, some securities-related and others not. 51 When this
occurred and we could not disentangle the regulators by reviewing the
company's earlier or later public filings, we counted each disclosed
securities-related matter once for purposes of this tally and we did not
attribute the action to any particular state. As a result, we did not
attribute a total of twelve securities-related state regulatory matters to
any state. Therefore, a total of ninety are attributable to a particular
state.
Table 4. Number of Disclosed Securities-Related
State Regulatory Matters
Total 102_
Attributable to Particular States 90
While slightly understated, these figures are clearly extremely small.
As Table 5 shows, the average number of attributed securities-related
state actions or investigations disclosed in the dataset on a per state
basis is only 1.8; it drops to 1.2 if New York is excluded. And this
covers a three-year time period.
Table 5. Disclosed Securities-Related State
Regulatory Matters: Per State Average
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Including All States 1.8 (5.0)
Excluding New York 1.2 (2.7)
5 1. For example, insurance companies sometimes lumped state investigations into their
contingent commission arrangements together with investigations into their sale of
"nontraditional" insurance products-allegedly sold to help companies cook their books. As
explained supra in note 17, we treat the latter but not the former as "securities-related."
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But as the standard deviations also reported in Table 5 suggest, there is
considerable variation across states. Table 6, which breaks down in
descending order of prevalence the disclosed securities-related state
matters attributable to each state, makes this variation apparent. As one
might predict, New York tops the list as the most active state,
responsible for 34% of these matters. More surprisingly, West Virginia
comes in second with 16%. Connecticut and Massachusetts also have
relatively strong showings, but the remaining forty-six states show
much less activity-indeed, thirty-two states were not reported to have
brought any securities-related enforcement actions or investigations
against the companies in our dataset.52 Table 6 also reports whether the
primary securities regulator in each state is appointed or elected and, if
elected, whether the regulator during the time frame examined was a
Republican or a Democrat.
53
52. Of course, this does not mean that these states' securities regulators were not hard at
work; the more appropriate inference is that they were directing their scarce resources to
securities-related misconduct of a more local ilk. For example, states have played an important
role in protecting elders from securities scams as well as in policing for fraud in the sale of
unregistered securities. See N. Am. SEC. ADM'RS ASSOC. ENFORCEMENT SECTION, 2010
ENFORCEMENT REP. 2, available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/2010-
Enforcement-Report.pdf (reporting that a majority of states' securities fraud cases "featured
unregistered individuals selling unregistered securities").
53. If the party affiliation of the elected official with primary responsibility for enforcing
a state's securities laws changed over the time period examined (2004-2006), we used the party
of the enforcer that served during a majority of the time period. This was an issue with respect
to only two states. In Delaware, a Republican stepped down as attorney general at the end of
2005 and was replaced with a Democrat (we thus treat Delaware as having a Republican
enforcer); in Missouri, a Democrat was elected Secretary of State in November 2004 to replace
a Republican (we thus treat Missouri as having a Democrat enforcer). Arizona is unique in that
the regulator with primary securities enforcement authority is a popularly elected five-person
commission; because all commissioners were Republican during the time period examined, we
treat Arizona as having a Republican enforcer.
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Table 6. Disclosed Securities-Related
State Regulatory Matters by State
State E (R/D) or No. %
A
N.Y. E(D) 31 34.4%
W.Va. E (D) 14 15.6%
Conn. E (D) 10 11.1%
Mass. E (D) 8 8.9%
Fla. A 4 4.4%
Ill. E (D) 4 4.4%
N.J. A 3 3.3%
Vt. A 3 3.3%
Ga. E (D) 2 2.2%
Minn. A 2 2.2%
N.H. A 2 2.2%
Cal. E (D) 1 1.1%
Colo. A 1 1.1%
Ind. E (R) 1 1.1%
Kan. A 1 1.1%
Okla. A 1 1.1%
S.C. E(R) 1 1.1%
Utah A 1 1.1%
Ala. A 0 0.0%
Alaska A 0 0.0%
Ariz. E (R) 0 0.0%
Ark. A 0 0.0%
Del. E (R) 0 0.0%
Haw. A 0 0.0%
Idaho 0.0%
State E (RD) No.
Iowa A 0 0.0%
Ky. A 0 0.0%
La. A 0 0.0%
Me. A 0 0.0%
Md. E (D) 0 0.0%
Mich. A 0 0.0%
Miss. E (D) 0 0.0%
Mo. E (D) 0 0.0%
Mont. E (D) 0 0.0%
Neb. A 0 0.0%
Nev. E (R) 0 0.0%
N.M. A 0 0.0%
N.C. E(D) 0 0.0%
N.D. A 0 0.0%
Ohio A 0 0.0%
Or. A 0 0.0%
Pa. A 0 0.0%
R.I. A 0 0.0%
S.D. A 0 0.0%
Tenn. A 0 0.0%
Tex. A 0 0.0%
Va. A 0 0.0%
Wash. A 0 0.0%
Wis. A 0 0.0%
Wyo. E (R) 0.0%
Elected state regulators differ from appointed state regulators in a
variety of ways. They are directly accountable to voters. They must run
a potentially costly campaign to obtain and retain their positions, an
endeavor which may require them to seek contributions from various
interest groups. Elected state regulators may be more likely to aspire to
higher elected office than their appointed counterparts. Do the political
forces that only elected enforcers confront lead to differences in
enforcement behavior? Our data suggest they might. As demonstrated in
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Table 7, the percentage of matters brought against the public companies
in our dataset attributable to states with an elected securities regulator
far exceeds the percentage of states with an appointed securities
regulator. States with elected securities regulators remain
overrepresented even if we exclude New York.54
Table 7. Disclosed Securities Enforcement Activity by States
with an Elected Securities Regulator
All States Excluding NY
36.0% 34.7%
States with Elected Official 36.0 347%(n= 18/50) (n= 17/49)
Actions Attributable to States 80.0% 69.5%
with Elected Official (n=72/90) (n=41/59)
During the time period we examined, the SEC and the Presidency
were both controlled by Republicans. Did the enforcement behavior of
states with an elected Democrat serving as the state securities regulator
differ from the enforcement behavior of other states? Our data suggest
that party affiliation may indeed have affected the enforcement behavior
of elected state securities regulators. As reported in Table 8, our data
indicates that states with elected Democrats serving as their primary
securities regulator were much more active in policing public
companies for securities-related misconduct than their representation
among all states, or even among the subset of states with elected
enforcers, would predict. Specifically, 24% of states had an elected
Democrat serving as the state securities regulator, yet these states were
responsible for 78% of the total number of state regulatory matters
attributable to particular states. Whereas 66% of the subset of states
with an elected securities regulator had a Democrat serving in the
position during the time period examined, states with elected Democrats
were responsible for 97% of the state regulatory matters attributable to
states with an elected regulator. States with an elected Democrat serving
as securities regulator remain overrepresented even if we exclude New
York.
54. New York's uniquely powerful Martin Act may set it apart from other states. See
supra note 43.
FLORIDA LA W REVIEW
Table 8. Disclosed Securities Enforcement Activity by States with an
Elected Democrat as Securities Regulator
States with
States with ElectedAll States Elected Securities
All States Excluding Securities Regulators
NY Regulators ExcludingNY
States with Elected 24.0% 22.5% 66% 65%
Democrat Regulator (n=12/50) (n=11/49) (n=12/18) (n= 11/17)
Actions Attributable to 77.8% 66.1% 97% 95%
these States (n=70/90) (n=39/59) (n=70/72) (n=39/41)
Any relationship between the elected status of a state's securities
enforcer, or his status as an elected Democrat, and the level of a state's
observed enforcement activity might, of course, be attributable to
random chance. It might also disappear if other state characteristics
likely to impact enforcement intensity are taken into account. Such
characteristics might include population, as states with larger
populations internalize a larger portion of the harm caused by public
companies' securities-related misconduct, and thus might invest more in
deterrence. Per capita government expenditures might also influence
enforcement intensity; states that spend more likely devote more
resources to securities enforcement vis-A-vis all companies, including
public companies. The level of a state's enforcement activity might also
change with the number of public companies headquartered in the state,
or the percentage of state GDP attributable to the financial sector,
though it is difficult to know in which directions these particular factors
will cut.5
5
55. The number of public companies headquartered in a state might bear a positive
relationship to the level of a state's enforcement activity, if being home to public companies
makes a state more sensitive to the cost of capital, and if greater enforcement helps reduce the
cost of capital (by, for example, increasing investors' confidence in company disclosures).
Similarly, the dependence of a state's economy on the financial sector might bear a positive
relationship to the level of a state's enforcement activity, if greater enforcement benefits the
financial sector (by, for example, increasing confidence in the markets and hence the number of
financial transactions). Conversely, both factors might bear a negative relationship to
enforcement activity if they increase the likelihood that a state is "captured" by managerial
interests who prefer lax enforcement, or if greater enforcement is not in fact beneficial in the
ways assumed above.
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We ran regressions to account for these possibilities. We selected a
negative binomial model because our variable of interest is over-
dispersed count data, specifically the number of state actions and
investigations brought by each state.56 In our first regression, the
independent variables were: (1) whether the state enforcer was elected
rather than appointed; 57 (2) the log of the state population;58 (3) state
general expenditures per capita;59 (4) the number of companies in our
dataset headquartered in the state; 60 and (5) the percentage of state GDP
attributable to the financial sector.61 The results, reported in the
Appendix at Table A. 12, show a statistically significant relationship
between the elected status of a state's enforcer and the number of
enforcement actions and investigations brought by the state. No other
independent variable had a statistically significant impact. The
coefficients in a negative binomial regression are difficult to interpret,
as they represent the difference in the logs of expected counts of the
dependent variable given a change in the particular independent variable
to which the coefficient attaches.62 It is therefore useful to convert the
coefficients into incident rate ratios (IRRs). In this regression, the IRR
for the elected state enforcer independent variable was 4.26. This means
56. See, e.g., A.C. CAMERON AND P.K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA
70-71 (1998). This model fit better than alternatives we tried, including Poisson. The p-value
for the chi-square was 0.0321 in the first regression discussed in the text and 0.0071 in the
second, suggesting that in both cases the model as a whole was statistically significant.
57. See supra note 28; supra Table 6.
58. We took the 2004-2006 average of each state's population, data we obtained from the
Census Bureau's website. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ (last visited Nov.
5, 2012).
59. We took the 2004-2006 average of each state's general expenditures, data we also
obtained from the Census Bureau's website, and divided by the 2004-2006 average population.
See id.; see also, e.g., States Ranked by Revenue and Expenditure Total Amount and Per Capita
Total Amount: 2004, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 14, 2010), http://www.census.gov/govs/state/
04rank.html.
60. We took the 2004-2006 average of the figures reported in Table A.4.
61. We took each state's total 2004-2006 GDP attributable to companies falling under the
North American Industry Classification System's (NAICS) code for "finance and insurance"
and divided by each state's total 2004-2006 annual GDP, data we obtained from the website of
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, www.bea.gov (last
visited Nov. 5, 2012). The NAICS defines the finance and insurance sector as comprising
"establishments primarily engaged in financial transactions (transactions involving the creation,
liquidation, or change in ownership of financial assets) and/or in facilitating financial
transactions." See 2007 NAICS Definition, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?code= 52&search=2007 NAICS Search (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
62. In a negative binomial regression, "the dependent variable is a count variable that is
either over- or under-dispersed, and the model models the log of the expected count as a
function of the predictor variables." State Annotated Output Negative Binomial Regression,
UCLA ACAD. TECH. SERVS., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/output/stata-nbreg output.htm
(last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
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that states with an elected securities regulator brought enforcement
actions and investigations at a rate more than four times that of states
with an appointed securities regulator, holding the other variables in the
model constant.
63
We ran a second regression to explore the relationship between
partisan affiliation and enforcement behavior. In this regression we used
the same variables as in the first, except we replaced the dummy
variable "elected rather than appointed" with the dummy variable
"elected and Democrat." 64 The results, reported in the Appendix at
Table A. 13, show a highly statistically significant relationship between
the status of a state's securities regulator as an elected Democrat and the
number of actions and investigations brought by the state. The IRR for
the elected Democrat independent variable was 6.84, meaning that
states with elected Democrats serving as their securities regulator
brought enforcement actions and investigations at a rate nearly seven
times that of other states, holding the other variables in the model
constant.65 This finding is highly statistically significant at the 0.01
level. Again, no other independent variable displayed a statistically
significant relationship to the number of enforcement actions brought.
6V
Another notable characteristic of the disclosed state actions and
investigations concerns the frequency with which they overlapped with
other enforcement efforts. As noted in Part II, nearly 100% of the
companies that disclosed being the target of a state regulatory
investigation or action reported being targeted by at least one other
securities enforcer over the course of the three-year period examined (as
compared to 56% for all companies disclosing some form of securities
63. These results persisted when New York was excluded as an outlier, except the model
overall lost statistical significance.
64. Another approach would have been to include the political affiliation of the enforcer
(Democrat or Republican) and the type of enforcer (appointed or elected) and create interaction
variables. But assigning a political affiliation to appointed enforcers is an uncertain task. Should
an appointed enforcer's personal political affiliation be referenced, or rather the political
affiliation of the person or entity that appointed him? The former data is not consistently
available, and is likely less relevant to enforcement behavior than the political affiliation of the
appointing person or entity. But if the political affiliation of the appointing person or entity were
used, the political affiliation variable would not have a consistent meaning across enforcer
types. We had too few observations to run a meaningful regression focused only on the subset of
states with elected enforcers.
65. It is possible that state securities regulators who are elected Democrats are always
more active than securities regulators who are either elected Republicans or appointed, or it may
be the case that they are more active when the SEC and the Presidency are controlled by
Republicans-which was the case during the 2004-2006 time frame examined. Without data on
state enforcement efforts during a time period when the SEC and the Presidency were controlled
by Democrats, we cannot separate out these two possibilities.
66. Again, these results persisted when New York was excluded as an outlier, except the
model overall lost statistical significance.
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litigation).67 As Table T.9 demonstrates, our review of these companies'
disclosures reveals that they were targeted by at least one other
securities enforcer with respect to the same or related misconduct a
remarkable 93% of the time. They faced overlapping enforcement by
public or quasi-public federal regulators 91% of the time and by private
enforcers 67% of the time.
Table 9. Disclosed Securities-Related State
Regulatory Matters: Percentage Involving
Overlapping Enforcement Efforts
Related Litigation by at Least One Other Enforcer 93.14%
Related Federal Regulatory Matter 91.18%
Related Private Litigation 66.67%
This degree of overlap is perhaps more understandable once the
topics of the state investigations and actions are taken into
consideration. As reported in Figure 1, 85% of the disclosed state
investigations and actions related to just four highly publicized industry-
wide scandals, each scandal at a slightly different stage of its life cycle
in the time period examined: (1) the mutual fund industry scandal over
market timing and late trading (46%);68 (2) the insurance industry
scandal involving the use of nontraditional insurance products to
manipulate financial results (17%);69 (3) the investment banking scandal
67. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 45.
69. The SEC began investigating the use of so-called "nontraditional" or "finite"
insurance products to manipulate financial results in early 2001. See Stipulated Order on
Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas and Prevent Destruction of Documents at 1,
SEC v. Greenburg, No. M-18-304 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/comp 19176.pdf (indicating that the SEC had "issued a formal order of
investigation in the Matter of Certain Loss Mitigation Unit Insurance Products" in March 2001).
Finite insurance (and reinsurance) limits substantially the loss the insurer (or reinsurer) can
suffer. Typically, a corporation will pay a large premium likely to cover all losses into an
account held with the insurer; "[i]f the cost of losses turns out to be less than the premium, the
carrier gives back the difference to the insured; if the losses turn out to be greater, the insured
pays an additional premium to the insurer." David M. Katz, Finite Insurance: Beyond the
Scandals, CFO.coM (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www3.cfo.com/article.cfm/3860547?currpage=0.
Finite products thus can resemble a deposit-loan arrangement more than a true risk-shifting
insurance transaction, but allow purchasers to utilize the different accounting treatment that
applies to insurance. See generally The Regulatory Implications of Finite Reinsurance (Nov.
2005), http://www.fieshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2005 /13067.pdf. In 2003, the SEC brought
suit against American International Group (AIG) and Brightpoint, Inc., alleging that AIG had
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over biased analyst research and IPO allocation practices (9%);70; and
(4) the mutual fund industry scandal over certain marketing practices,
such as directed brokerage (8%). 7 1 An additional six actions (6%)
fashioned and sold Brightpoint "a purported 'insurance' product that Brightpoint used to report
false and misleading financial information to the public." See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges
American International Group and Others in Brightpoint Securities Fraud (Sept. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-111 .htm. The action, which AIG and
Brightpoint ultimately settled for $10 million and $450,000 in civil penalties, respectively,
heightened regulatory interest in the use of finite insurance products, and led to further
investigations of (and enforcement actions against) AIG by the SEC, DOJ, and NYAG, as well
as a broader probe of the insurance industry by these and other regulators. See, e.g., Patrick
Jenkins, Spitzer Probe Hits Finite Reinsurance, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.ft.com/intcms/s/0/baaf6aae-Oa9b-1 Ida-aa9b-00000e2511 c8.html#axzz2BTKwftrk
(observing that "[d]ozens of reinsurers, primary insurers and brokers have been drawn into the
investigation"); SEC's Insurance Inquiry Includes General Re, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2004),
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/dec/31/business/fi-berkshire31 ("Regulators, including
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, have subpoenaed or requested information from
several insurers on [finite] policies, which are being scrutinized as a possible way for companies
to hide losses.").
70. See supra note 44.
71. An open-end mutual fund's investment advisor benefits when brokers successfully
market fund shares, because the advisor's compensation is typically based on total fund assets
under management-and fund assets grow as fund shares are sold. A mutual fund's investment
advisor also generally controls which brokers the fund selects to effect commission-generating
transactions in its underlying securities. Thus, a potential conflict of interest exists, as a fund's
investment advisor may direct the fund's brokerage needs not based on what is in the best
interest of the fund, but instead based on the efforts brokers have made to market the fund's
shares. The investment advisor can also reward brokers for their marketing efforts in other ways
that are not always transparent to fund investors or the public. See John P. Freeman, The Mutual
Fund Distribution Expense Mess, 32 J. CORP. L. 739, 791-99 (2007) (discussing the use of
revenue-sharing and soft-dollar arrangements). This, in turn, can incentivize brokers to push
their clients to select mutual funds based not on what is in the client's best interest, but instead
based on which funds have promised the broker the best reward. A complex web of SEC and
NASD rules have long existed to deal with these structural conflicts, and both regulators had
been reviewing their efficacy prior to the release of Spitzer's Canary Complaint in September
2003. But in the wake of the Canary Complaint, and the increased public scrutiny of the mutual
fund industry it prompted, regulatory focus on the conflicts surrounding mutual fund marketing
intensified. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Has Found Payoffs in Sales of Mutual Funds, N. Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at Al (noting that the SEC had been focusing on these issues since April
2003, but the inquiries "gained urgency" in September); see also D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC's
Mistaken Ban on Directed Brokerage: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 40 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1241,
1247-67 (2008). The SEC and NASD brought numerous enforcement actions against fund
managers and brokers for failing to adequately disclose the basis upon which the funds'
brokerage business was directed, see George Serafeim, Directed Brokerage No More: The
Effects of New Regulation in the Mutual Fund Industry, at Table 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working
Papers Series, July 10, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 157917
(identifying forty-three such actions, resulting in over $426 million in fines); new rules were
enacted, see Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution, 69 Fed.
Reg. 54728, 54728 (Sept. 9, 2004); state regulatory interest in the matter was piqued, see, e.g.,
Tom Lauricella, California Tackles Disclosure Issues at Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J. , Sept. 16,
2004, at Cl; and class actions were filed, see, e.g., Edward Jones Agrees to Settle 9 Lawsuits,
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related to one of the two mutual fund industry scandals just mentioned,
but ambiguity in the disclosures made it impossible for us to determine
which. The remaining 15% of the disclosed state regulatory
investigations and actions involved other types of misconduct. This
subset also involved a large degree of overlap with federal regulatory
efforts (73%), but less than did the group of state regulatory matters
overall (9 1%).
M.
Fmd
Figure 1
Which types of companies did the states target? A couple of clear
trends emerge from the data. First, 93% of the targeted firms hail from
. .6~
the financial sector, a result that is not surprising given that the topics of
most of the state regulatory matters concerned scandals that beset that
sector.72 Second, states most often targeted firms that were neither
headquartered nor incorporated in their state, doing so in 68% of the
disclosed matters attributable to particular states.73
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at C2.
72. When we refer to firms in the "financial sector," we are referring to firms which the
SEC's Edgar database indicate have Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes falling under
"Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate" in the Occupational Safety & Health
Administration's SIC Manual. See Division H. Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMiN., http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sicmanual.html (last
visited Nov. 5, 2012). Although there are 102 distinct state regulatory matters disclosed in our
dataset, these were directed at only forty-two firms. The targeted firms, and their SIC codes, are
reported in the appendix at Table A. 11.
73. In calculating this figure, we considered a state as targeting a company headquartered
4232013]
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CONCLUSIONS & EXTENSIONS
This Article substantiates the claim that U.S. public companies
experience significant amounts of material litigation. In particular, they
experience high levels of securities litigation-often at the hands of
multiple different enforcers. Of the 1,977 public companies whose Form
10-Ks we reviewed, 72% disclosed some form of material litigation
over the three-year period examined, and 27% disclosed some form of
securities litigation. Well over half of the companies that disclosed
securities litigation reported facing two or more different forms of
securities litigation over the course of the three-year period examined,
and nearly 30% reported facing three or more. Many of these companies
were likely targeted by different securities law enforcers with respect to
the same or related misconduct. We know, for example, that the subset
of companies disclosing a securities-related state regulatory action or
investigation were targeted by another securities law enforcer with
respect to the same or related misconduct a remarkable 93% of the time.
These striking figures suggest it is worthwhile for policymakers to
rethink the allocation of securities law enforcement authority in the
United States-an allocation that currently has more to do with
historical happenstance than thoughtful design choices. 74 Questions
worthy of further exploration include: What value is added when
multiple enforcers target public firms for the same misconduct? Do
different securities enforcers vindicate different normative aspirations?
When it comes to imposing sanctions on public companies for
securities-related misconduct, the argument has been made that the only
sensible goal is deterrence, whether the litigation takes the form of a
civil regulatory action, a criminal prosecution, or a private class action
lawsuit. 5 If this is the case, how does the use of multiple enforcers
advance (or retard) the goal of optimal deterrence? One obvious
response is that it guards against the underdeterrence that might arise
should a single entity, such as the SEC, be granted an enforcement
monopoly. But that answer is too facile, as it ignores the real costs that
or incorporated within the state if the reporting company was headquartered or incorporated
within the enforcing state or if the action related to a subsidiary of the reporting company that
was headquartered or incorporated within the enforcing state.
74. See, e.g., Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 1, at 1310-15
(discussing the historically contingent evolution of Rule lob-5 class action enforcement).
75. See, e.g., id at 1312-13 (discussing the consensus view that securities fraud class
actions cannot be justified on compensatory grounds). A more nuanced version of this argument
is that corporate sanctions can be justified as a means of deterring managers whose misbehavior
is best viewed as a form of agency cost; holding the corporate entity (and, ultimately, its public
shareholders) liable may aid in this endeavor if doing so produces information that allows
shareholders to better discipline management. See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire,
Intraporfolio Litigation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1679, 1680-81 (2011).
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76can result from the use of multiple enforcers. Further thought should
be given to whether there are more efficient ways to guard against
underdeterrence.7
This Article also sheds light on what has heretofore been an
empirical lacuna: the role played by state regulators in policing public
companies for securities-related misconduct. Our data reveals that, at
least in the time frame examined, state regulators were significantly less
active than their private and federal counterparts. Most states were not
identified as having brought any enforcement actions or investigations
against the public companies in our dataset. The states that were so
identified tended to target out-of-state firms (68%) and to focus their
efforts on scandals that beset the financial industry and also caught the
attention of other securities law enforcers. In 91% of the disclosed state
matters, there was an overlapping federal action or investigation, and in
67% there was overlapping private litigation. This does not reveal
whether the state actions were largely redundant, or whether they
mostly added value-by, for example, first exposing misconduct that
would have otherwise gone undetected. Further research, including a
qualitative review of the state matters disclosed in our dataset, could
help shed light on the social value of NSMIA's fraud carve-out, as well
as provide insights into state regulatory behavior more broadly.78
One thing our analysis does make clear is that, at least in the time
period examined, state securities enforcement activity against public
firms was more likely if the state securities enforcer served in an elected
position than if he served in an appointed position, and more likely still
if the enforcer was an elected Democrat. The statistically significant
results of our regressions show that these sets of enforcers brought
enforcement actions and investigations at roughly four and seven times
the rate, respectively, of other enforcers, when controlling for other
variables likely to influence enforcement intensity. This raises
interesting questions worthy of further reflection. Why are these
enforcers more active? What do their unique incentives tell us about the
likely social value of state enforcement? The SEC was deliberately
designed to be a politically insulated independent administrative
agency. Might unleashing elected state regulators to supplement the
SEC's efforts upset the policy goals underlying that choice? If so, is this
76. See supra note 1, Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence,
at 2176 (exploring the costs of a multi-enforcer approach to securities fraud deterrence).
77. See, e.g., id. (exploring this question); Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform,
supra note 1, at 1349 (suggesting ways to efficiently restructure the relationship between public
and private securities fraud enforcement).
78. One of the authors has undertaken such an effort. See Amanda M. Rose, State
Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities
Realm), 97 MiNN. L. REv. 1343.
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cost outweighed by other benefits of state enforcement? Further
qualitative review of the state actions disclosed in our dataset could help
illuminate the answers to these important questions as well.79
79. See id.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1. Percentage of Incorporations by State
Delaware 58.7%
2 Maryland 8.6%
3 New York 3.1%
4 Ohio 3.1%
5 Pennsylvania 2.4%
6 Texas 2.0%
7 Florida 1.7%
8 Virginia 1.7%
9 Nevada 1.6%
10 Georgia 1.4%
11 Wisconsin 1.4%
12 Massachusetts 1.2%
13 New Jersey 1.2%
14 Minnesota 1.1%
15 California 1.0%
16 Indiana 1.0%
17 Michigan 1.0%
18 North Carolina 1.0%
19 Missouri 0.8%
20 Washington 0.8%
21 Tennessee 0.7%
22 Illinois 0.5%
23 Oregon 0.5%
24 Iowa 0.4%
Connecticut 0.3%
Kansas 0.3%
27 Oklahoma 0.3%
28 Arizona 0.2%
29 Hawaii 0.2%
30 Louisiana 0.2%
31 Utah 0.2%
32 Vermont 0.2%
33 Alabama 0.1%
34 Colorado 0.1%
35 Idaho 0.1%
36 Kentucky 0.1%
37 Mississippi 0.1%
38 Nebraska 0.1%
39 New Hampshire 0.1%
40 New Mexico 0.1%
41 Rhode Island 0.1%
42 South Carolina 0.1%
43 South Dakota 0.1%
44 Wyoming 0.1%
45 Alaska 0.0%
46 Arkansas 0.0%
47 Maine 0.0%
48 Montana 0.0%
49 North Dakota 0.0%
West Virginia 0.0%
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 30.
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Table A.2. Incorporations by State: Year by Year Results
2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %
Alabama 3 0.2% 2 0.1% 2 0.1%
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Arizona 4 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2%
Arkansas 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 0 0.0%
California 19 1.0% 18 1.0% 17 1.0%
Colorado 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 3 0.2%
Connecticut 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 6 0.3%
Delaware 1066 57.8% 1067 58.6% 1063 59.8%
Florida 35 1.9% 31 1.7% 29 1.6%
Georgia 26 1.4% 25 1.4% 23 1.3%
Hawaii 4 0.2% 4 0.2% 4 0.2%
Idaho 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 2 0.1%
Illinois 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 8 0.5%
Indiana 19 1.0% 19 1.0% 18 1.0%
Iowa 8 0.4% 8 0.4% 8 0.5%
Kansas 5 0.3% 5 0.3% 5 0.3%
Kentucky 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 1 0.1%
Louisiana 4 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2%
Maine 2 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Maryland 161 8.7% 162 8.9% 145 8.2%
Massachusetts 24 1.3% 23 1.3% 21 1.2%
Michigan 17 0.9% 18 1.0% 17 1.0%
Minnesota 21 1.1% 21 1.2% 20 1.1%
Mississippi 2 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Missouri 15 0.8% 14 0.8% 15 0.8%
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 3 0.2% 2 0.1% 2 0.1%
Nevada 29 1.6% 28 1.5% 29 1.6%
NewH e 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%Hampshire
New Jersey 22 1.2% 21 1.2% 21 1.2%
New Mexico 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
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Table A.2. Incorporations by State: Year by Year Results
(cont'd)
2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %
New York 59 3.2 57 3.1 55 3.1
NorthCari 18 1.0% 18 1.0% 17 1.0%Carolina
NorthDota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%Dakota
Ohio 57 3.1% 57 3.1% 54 3.0%
Oklahoma 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 7 0.4%
Oregon 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 9 0.5%
Pennsylvania 44 2.4% 43 2.4% 41 2.3%
Rhode Island 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
SouthColin 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 2 0.1%Carolina
SouthDota 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1%Dakota
Tennessee 13 0.7% 13 0.7% 11 0.6%
Texas 38 2.1% 36 2.0% 35 2.0%
Utah 4 0.2% 4 0.2% 4 0.2%
Vermont 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2%
Virginia 32 1.7% 31 1.7% 31 1.7%
Washington 14 0.8% 14 0.8% 13 0.7%
WestVgni 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%Virginia
Wisconsin 26 1.4% 24 1.3% 24 1.4%
Wyoming 2 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 30.
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Table A.3. Percentage of Headquarters by State
Texas
New York
12.4%
10.6%
3 California 10.0%
4 Illinois 5.8%
5 Pennsylvania 5.3%
6 Ohio 4.9%
7 New Jersey 4.3%
8 Florida 3.8%
9 Georgia 3.2%
10 Connecticut 3.0%
11 Massachusetts 2.8%
12 Virginia 2.8%
Michigan 2.6%
Oklahoma 0.9%
27 Iowa 0.8%
28 Louisiana 0.8%
29 Oregon 0.8%
30 Kentucky 0.7%
31 Nebraska 0.7%
32 Delaware 0.5%
33 South Carolina 0.5%
34 Utah 0.5%
35 Arkansas 0.4%
36 Hawaii 0.4%
37 Kansas 0.4%
Idaho
-~ - ± ±-t-± t
Missouri 2.3%
15 Minnesota 2.2%
16 North Carolina 2.1%
17 Tennessee 1.9%
18 Colorado 1.8%
19 Indiana 1.6%
20 Maryland 1.6%
21 Wisconsin 1.5%
22 Arizona 1.2%
23 Washington 1.1%
24 Alabama 1.0%
Nevada 1.0%
Mississippi
0.3%
0.3%
40 New Hampshire 0.3%
41 Rhode Island 0.3%
42 Maine 0.2%
43 Vermont 0.2%
44 Montana 0.1%
45 New Mexico 0.1%
46 North Dakota 0.1%
47 South Dakota 0.1%
48 Alaska 0.0%
49 West Virginia 0.0%
Wyoming 0.0%
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 31.
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Table A.4. Headquarters by State: Year by Year Results
2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %
Alabama 13 0.7% 13 0.7% 11 0.6%
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Arizona 24 1.3% 21 1.2% 21 1.2%
Arkansas 8 0.4% 7 0.4% 7 0.4%
California 195 10.6% 186 10.2% 164 9.2%
Colorado 33 1.8% 33 1.8% 31 1.7%
Connecticut 56 3.0% 54 3.0% 54 3.0%
Delaware 10 0.5% 9 0.5% 9 0.5%
Florida 73 4.0% 69 3.8% 65 3.7%
Georgia 60 3.3% 61 3.4% 55 3.1%
Hawaii 7 0.4% 7 0.4% 6 0.3%
Idaho 6 0.3% 6 0.3% 5 0.3%
Illinois 102 5.5% 107 5.9% 104 5.9%
Indiana 32 1.7% 29 1.6% 28 1.6%
Iowa 14 0.8% 14 0.8% 13 0.7%
Kansas 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 8 0.5%
Kentucky 13 0.7% 14 0.8% 12 0.7%
Louisiana 16 0.9% 16 0.9% 14 0.8%
Maine 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2%
Maryland 27 1.5% 31 1.7% 29 1.6%
Massachusetts 56 3.0% 53 2.9% 46 2.6%
Michigan 47 2.6% 48 2.6% 48 2.7%
Minnesota 40 2.2% 41 2.3% 40 2.3%
Mississippi 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 6 0.3%
Missouri 44 2.4% 40 2.2% 39 2.2%
Montana 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Nebraska 14 0.8% 13 0.7% 11 0.6%
Nevada 19 1.0% 17 0.9% 17 1.0%
NewH e 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 5 0.3%Hampshire
New Jersey 76 4.1% 78 4.3% 82 4.6%
New Mexico 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 2 0.1%
New York 190 10.3% 194 10.7% 195 11.0%
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Table A.4. Headquarters by State: Year by Year Results (cont'd)
2004 2006 2006
States #_ % # % # %
NorthCarli 36 2.0% 39 2.1% 40 2.3%Carolina
North Dakota 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Ohio 90 4.9% 89 4.9% 88 5.0%
Oklahoma 16 0.9% 16 0.9% 17 1.0%
Oregon 14 0.8% 14 0.8% 13 0.7%
Pennsylvania 95 5.2% 94 5.2% 97 5.5%
Rhode Island 7 0.4% 6 0.3% 5 0.3%
SouthColin 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 8 0.5%Carolina
South Dakota 2 0.1% 2 0.1% 3 0.2%
Tennessee 34 1.9% 35 1.9% 35 2.0%
Texas 224 12.2% 219 12.0% 230 12.9%
Utah 9 0.5% 9 0.5% 9 0.5%
Vermont 4 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2%
Virginia 52 2.8% 52 2.9% 51 2.9%
Washington 19 1.0% 20 1.1% 19 1.1%
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.1%
Wisconsin 28 1.5% 27 1.5% 27 1.5%
Wyoming 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
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Table A.5. Percentage of Companies Headquartered
and Incorporated in a Single State
Year All Companies Excluding Companies
_ear Allompanies__ Incorporated In Delaware
2004 29.1% 67.8%
2005 28.5% 67.7%
2006 27.7% 67.6%
Table A.6. Percentage of Companies Headquartered
and Incorporated in a Single State by State
Ohio 9.9%
2 New York 7.9%
3 Texas 7.0%
4 Pennsylvania 6.9%
5 Florida 5.6%
6 Wisconsin 4.7%
7 Georgia 4.4%
8 Virginia 4.1%
9 Massachusetts 3.6%
10 Minnesota 3.5%
11 Michigan 3.4%
12 California 3.2%
13 Maryland 3.2%
14 New Jersey 3.0%
15 Indiana 2.8%
16 North Carolina 2.8%
17 Washington 2.5%
18 Missouri 2.3%
19 Tennessee 2.2%
20 Nevada 1.9%
21 Delaware 1.7%
22 Oregon 1.7%
23 Iowa 1.6%
24 Illinois 1.5%
Oklahoma 1.0%
26 Connecticut 0.8%
27 Hawaii 0.8%
28 Arizona 0.6%J
29 Louisiana 0.6%
30 Utah 0.6%
31 Vermont 0.6%
32 South Carolina 0.5%
33 Nebraska 0.5%
34 Alabama 0.4%
35 Idaho 0.4%
36 Kentucky 0.3%
37 Kansas 0.3%
38 Mississippi 0.3%
39 South Dakota 0.3%
40 New Hampshire 0.2%
41 New Mexico 0.2%
42 Rhode Island .2%
43 Maine 0.1%
44 Colorado .1%
45 Alaska 0.0%
46 Arkansas 0.0%
47 Montana 0.0%
48 North Dakota 0.0%
49 West Virginia 0.0%
50 Wyoming 0.0%
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 32.
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Table A.7. Companies Headquartered and Incorporated in a
Single State by State: Year by Year Results
2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %
Alabama 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0%
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Arizona 4 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0%
Arkansas 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
California 18 3.0% 17 3.0% 15 3.0%
Colorado 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Connecticut 4 1.0% 4 1.0% 4 1.0%
Delaware 9 2.0% 9 2.0% 9 2.0%
Florida 31 6.0% 28 5.0% 27 5.0%
Georgia 24 4.0% 23 4.0% 21 4.0%
Hawaii 4 1.0% 4 1.0% 4 1.0%
Idaho 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0%
Illinois 8 1.0% 8 2.0% 7 1.0%
Indiana 15 3.0% 15 3.0% 14 3.0%
Iowa 8 1.0% 8 2.0% 8 2.0%
Kansas 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Kentucky 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0%
Louisiana 4 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0%
Maine 2 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Maryland 16 3.0% 19 4.0% 15 3.0%
Massachusetts 20 4.0% 19 4.0% 17 3.0%
Michigan 17 3.0% 18 3.0% 17 3.0%
Minnesota 18 3.0% 18 3.0% 18 4.0%
Mississippi 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Missouri 12 2.0% 12 2.0% 12 2.0%
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 3 1.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0%
Nevada 10 2.0% 9 2.0% 10 2.0%
New Hampshire 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
New Jersey 16 3.0% 15 3.0% 15 3.0%
New Mexico 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
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Table A.7. Companies Headquartered and Incorporated in a
Single State by State: Year by Year Results (cont'd)
2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %_
New York 42 8.0% 41 8.0% 39 8.0%
North Carolina 15 3.0% 15 3.0% 14 3.0%
North Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Ohio 52 10.0% 52 10.0% 49 10.0%
Oklahoma 5 1.0% 5 1.0% 6 1.0%
Oregon 9 2.0% 9 2.0% 9 2.0%
Pennsylvania 36 7.0% 36 7.0% 34 7.0%
Rhode Island 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
South Carolina 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 2 0.0%
South Dakota 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0%
Tennessee 12 2.0% 12 2.0% 10 2.0%
Texas 38 7.0% 36 7.0% 35 7.0%
Utah 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0%
Vermont 3 1.0% 3 1.0% 3 1.0%
Virginia 22 4.0% 21 4.0% 20 4.0%
Washington 13 2.0% 13 3.0% 12 2.0%
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin 25 5.0% 24 5.0% 23 5.0%
Wyoming 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
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Table A.8. Percentage of Incorporations by State:
Companies Incorporated Outside their Headquarters' State
Delaware 81.4%
Maryland 10.7%
Nevada 1.5%
New York 1.3%
Virginia 0.8%
Pennsylvania 0.6%
New Jersey 0.5%
Ohio 0.4%
Indiana 0.3%
Kansas 0.3%
Massachusetts 0.3%
Colorado 0.2%
Connecticut 0.2%
Florida 0.2%
Georgia 0.2%
Minnesota
Missouri
0.2%
0.2%
North Carolina 0.2%
Arkansas 0.1%
California 0.1%
Illinois 0.1%
Oklahoma 0.1%
Tennessee 0.1%
Utah 0.1%
Washington 0.1%
Wisconsin 0.1%
Wyoming 0.1%
Alabama 0.0%
Alaska 0.0%
Arizona 0.0%
Hawaii 0.0%
Idaho 0.0%
Iowa 0.0%
Kentucky 0.0%
Louisiana 0.0%
Maine 0.0%
Michigan 0.0%
Mississippi 0.0%
Montana 0.0%
Nebraska 0.0%
New
Hampshire
New Mexico
0.0%
0.0%
North Dakota 0.0%
Oregon 0.0%
Rhode Island 0.0%
South
Carolina
South Dakota 0.0%
Texas 0.0%
Vermont 0.0%
I West Virginia 0.0%
Note: For the method of computation, see supra note 33.
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Table A.9. Incorporations by State of Companies Incorporated
Outside their Headquarters' State: Year by Year Results
2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %
Delaware 1057 81.1% 1058 81.4% 1054 82.0%
Maryland 145 11.1% 143 11.0% 130 10.1%
Nevada 19 1.5% 19 1.5% 19 1.5%
New York 17 1.3% 16 1.2% 16 1.2%
Virginia 10 0.8% 10 0.8% 11 0.9%
Pennsylvania 8 0.6% 7 0.5% 7 0.5%
New Jersey 6 0.5% 6 0.5% 6 0.5%
Ohio 5 0.4% 5 0.4% 5 0.4%
Indiana 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 4 0.3%
Massachusetts 4 0.3% 4 0.3% 4 0.3%
Kansas 3 0.2% 4 0.3% 4 0.3%
Florida 4 0.3% 3 0.2% 2 0.2%
North
Carolina 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 3 0.2%
Minnesota 3 0.2% 3 0.2% 2 0.2%
Missouri 3 0.2% 2 0.2% 3 0.2%
Colorado 1 0.1% 2 0.2% 3 0.2%
Connecticut 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 2 0.2%
Georgia 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 2 0.2%
California 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.2%
Wyoming 2 0.2% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Illinois 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Oklahoma 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Tennessee 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Utah 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Washington 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 1 0.1%
Arkansas 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.1%
Alabama 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Alaska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Arizona 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Hawaii 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Idaho 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Iowa 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Kentucky 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Louisiana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Maine 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
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2004 2005 2006
States # % # % # %
Michigan 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Mississippi 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Montana 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
New
Hampshire 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
New Mexico 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
North Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Oregon 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Rhode Island 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
South
Carolina 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
South Dakota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Texas 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Vermont 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
West Virginia 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Table A.10. Item 3 Litigation Disclosures: Year by Year Results
2004 2005 2006
Litigation Type # % # % # %
Any Material Litigation 1169 63.4% 1180 64.8% 1139 64.1%
Securities Litigation 371 20.1% 380 20.9% 383 21.5%
" Class Action 273 14.8% 277 15.2% 274 15.4%
" Derivative 160 9.0% 172 9.0% 183 10.0%
Action 
___ ___
* FederalRegulatory 155 8.4% 169 9.3% 171 9.6%
State
Regulatory 36 2.0% 33 1.8% 29 1.6%
Note: Our dataset included a total of 1843 Form 10-Ks from FY
2004, 1820 from FY 2005, and 1778 from FY 2006.
Table A.9. Incorporations by State of Companies IncorporatedOutside their Headauarters' State: Year bv Year Results (cant'd1
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Table A.11. Firms Targeted in Disclosed Securities-Related State
Regulatory Matters with SIC Codes
Division E. Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services
Williams Companies, Inc. 4922-Natural Gas Transmission
The AES 499 1--Cogeneration Services & Small Power
Corporation/IPALCO Producers
Division F: Wholesale Trade
Michael Stores, Inc. 5945-Retail-Hobby, Toy, & Game Shops
Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real
Estate
Major Group 60. Depository Institutions
Bank of America Corporation 6021-National and Commercial Banks
Citigroup Inc. 6021-National and Commercial Banks
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 6021-National and Commercial Banks
KeyCorp 6021-National and Commercial Banks
PNC Financial Services
Group Inc. 6021-National and Commercial Banks
Major Group 61: Non-depository Credit
Institutions
American Express
Co./Ameriprise 6199-Finance Services
The Bear Stearns Company 6189-Asset-Backed Secutities
6035-Savings Institution, Federally
Astoria Financial Corporation Chartered
Major Group 62: Security And Commodity
Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services
AllianceBernstein Holding
L.P. 6282-Investment Advice
Federated Investors, Inc. 6282-Investment Advice
Franklin Resources Inc. 6282-Investment Advice
Janus Capital Group Inc. 6282-Investment Advice
Legg Mason Inc. 6282-Investment Advice
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
BlackRock Inc. Companies
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
GAMCO Investors, Inc. Companies
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Companies
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
Morgan Stanley Companies
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Table A.11. Firms Targeted in Disclosed Securities-Related State
Regulatory Matters with SIC Codes (cont'd)
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers,& Flotation
Piper Jaffray Companies Companies
Waddell & Reed Financial, 621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
Inc. Companies
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
A.G. Edwards, Inc. Companies
621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Companies
The Charles Schwab 621 1-Security Brokers, Dealers, & Flotation
Corporation Companies
Credit Suisse First 6200-Security & Commodity Brokers,
Boston, Inc. Dealers, Exchanges & Services
Major Group 63: Insurance Carriers
American International
Group Inc. 6331-Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 6331-Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance
Chubb Corporation 6331-Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance
Travelers Companies Inc. 6331-Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance
Bristol West Holdings, Inc. 6331-Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance
UnitedHealth Group Inc. 6324-Hospital & Medical Service Plans
CNO Financial Group, Inc. 6321-Accident & Health Insurance
Lincoln National Corp. 6311-Life Insurance
MetLife, Inc. 6311-Life Insurance
Prudential Financial, Inc. 6311-Life Insurance
AXA Financial, Inc. 6311-Life Insurance
Nationwide Financial
Servs., Inc. 6311-Life Insurance
Phoenix Companies Inc. 6311-Life Insurance
Major Group 64: Insurance Agents, Brokers,
And Service
Marsh & McLennan Cos.,
Inc. 6411-Insurance Agents, Brokers & Services
MBIA Inc. 6351-Surety Insurance
Major Group 65: Real Estate
W. P. Carey & Co. LLC 6500-Real Estate
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Table A.12. Negative Binomial Regression Results for State
Characteristics, Including Status of
Enforcer as Elected versus Appointed, on Number of Enforcement
Matters Brought
Number of
Observations 50
Independent Coefficient Std. Error Incident Std. Error.
Variable Rate Ratio
Elected
Securities 1.4497** 0.6116 4.2617** 2.6063
Regulator
No.
Headquarters in 0.0102 0.0144 1.0103 0.0146
State
State
Population -0.0334 0.6860 0.9672 0.6634
(Log)
State Per
Capita General 0.1706 0.4207 1.1860 0.4990
Exp.
% State GDP - 0.7910 8.9752 2.2056 19.7960
Finance Sector
Constant -1.2441 11.5069 0.2882 3.3164
Note. * p< 0 .10 , ** p50.05, * p<0.01
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Table A.13. Negative Binomial Regression Results for State
Characteristics, Including
Status of Enforcer as Elected Democrat or Not, on Number of
Enforcement Matters Brought
Number of 50
Observations
Independent Coefficient Std. Error Incident Std. Error
Variable Rate Ratio
Elected
Democrat 1.9225*** 0.6233 6.8383*** 4.2626
Securities
Regulator
No.
Headquarters 0.0056 0.0122 1.0057 0.01223
in State
State
Population 0.0973 0.6097 1.1022 0.6720
(Log)
State Per
Capita General 0.1630 0.3703 1.1770 0.4358
Exp.
%StateGDP- 1.3607 7.4017 3.8989 28.8580
Finance Sector
Constant -3.1301 10.1980 0.04371 0.4458
Note: * p_<0.10, ** p50.05, * p<0.01
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